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Introduction

Corruption and scandal are commonplace in today's world. Since President Nixon’s
Watergate scandal, corruption has been at the forefront of the public eye.1 While generally
corruption has been reserved for politics and large businesses, the sports industry has not been
exempt from the influence of corruption.2 More recently, corruption and scandal in sports have
become more prevalent.3 In 2015, the soccer world and the Olympics both experienced scandal
due to corruption from what has been titled the “FIFA scandal”4 and the “Russian Doping
Scandal.”5 These scandals rocked the sports world and led many to be concerned about the future
of sports.
On September 26, 2017, college basketball fell victim to its own scandal as corruption
and fraud were investigated by the FBI.6 Coaches, players and apparel company executives were
implicated in one of the biggest incidents of corruption in National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) history.7 This scandal, in addition to the FIFA and Russian Doping
scandals, caught the attention of the world. In response to the impropriety found within sports
throughout the world, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) developed a plan to help countries maintain the integrity of sports.8 This plan calls
for action by the member states of the United Nations (UN) to protect the integrity of sports in
their respective countries.9 This response was a world-wide recognition that sports are important
for the stability of a country and not just for entertainment.10
The recognition by UNESCO accentuates the significance of corruption in sports.
Corruption in sports, and especially collegiate athletics, is often marginalized11 and considered
trivial in comparison to the issues of corruption in the fields of business and politics. In reality,
the impact of sports on society is considerable, and the effort to preserve the integrity of sports
deserves more attention. Sports maintain a requited relationship with societal values.12 Societal
values are incorporated into sports and reinforced when communities engage and participate in
1

See e.g. National Constitution Center Staff, The Legacy of Watergate: Five ways life changed after the scandal,
CONSTITUTION DAILY, https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-legacy-of-watergate-five-important-changes-after-thescandal (last visited Nov. 7, 2018).
2
See e.g. GRAHAM BROOKS ET AL., FRAUD, CORRUPTION AND SPORT 4-8 (2013).
3
See e.g. Sue Williams, Corruption in sport: a “gold rush” with the law left behind, UNESCO,
https://en.unesco.org/news/corruption-sport-%E2%80%9Cgold-rush%E2%80%9D-law-left-behind (last visited Jan.
12, 2019).
4
See e.g Rebecca Ruiz & Victor Mather, The FIFA Scandal: What’s Happened, and What’s to Come, THE N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/sports/soccer/the-fifa-scandal-whats-happened-and-whats-tocome.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2018).
5
See e.g. Antoine Duval, The Russian doping scandal at the court of arbitration for sport: lessons for the world
anti-doping system, 16 INT. SPORTS LAW J. 177 (2017).
6
See Colin Ward-Henninger, Report: High-profile NBA agency raided by FBI amid NCAA basketball investigation,
CBS SPORTS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.cbssports.com/nba/news/report-high-profile-nba-agency-raided-by-fbiamid-ncaa-basketball-investigation/.
7
Mitch Sherman, Everything you need to know about the college basketball scandal, ESPN (Feb. 23, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/22555512/explaining-ncaa-college-basketball-scandalplayers-coaches-agents.
8
See UNESCO, MINEPS VI – Kazan 2017, https://en.unesco.org/mineps6/kazan-action-plan (last visited Nov. 10,
2018).
9
UNESCO, KAZAN ACTION PLAN at 3 (2017) (hereinafter UNESCO, KAZAN PLAN).
10
Id.
11
See MATHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW & REGULATIONS 4 (Wolters Kluwer, 4th ed. 2017).
12
Id. at 5-6.
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them.13 Sports also enable sustainable development and contribute to tolerance, peace, health,
education and social inclusion in each location where they are found.14 The lack of attention
given to corruption in sports has left the corruption to grow and fester without the attention
needed to hinder its existence. This is a mistake that needs to be addressed in order to protect
societal values and ensure the continuing benefits that are derived from sports.
In the United States, the National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) stands as the
protector of college sports from corruption.15 This protection comes with the pillar of amateurism
which the NCAA clings to in order to maintain the status quo enabling much of its power.16 This
concept of amateurism has been discussed in various journal articles and is still in debate.17 This
article does not seek to contribute to this discussion but rather will discuss how corruption in
college sports may be fought without discussing the amateurism principle.
The uniqueness of the NCAA brings about challenges and concerns, in fighting
corruption, that have once again been emphasized by the FBI investigation and the plan that has
been proposed by UNESCO. The NCAA with all of its supposed power does not currently have
an effective mechanism to punish or deter the growth of corruption. This article will begin with a
brief history of the formation of the NCAA and the current governance model to illustrate how
the NCAA utilizes the power that it does have. It will then highlight the key issues brought to
light by the FBI probe in the NCAA and discuss a proposal on how the NCAA, professional
sports leagues and the United States government may come together to protect the integrity of
college sports.
I. Brief History of the Formation of the NCAA
In the beginning, college sports was without form and void; and darkness was on the face
of college athletics.18 In the 1840s football players at Harvard and Yale were competing for the
13

Id.
See UNESCO, KAZAN PLAN supra note 9 at 1-4.
15
See e.g. NCAA, Fairness, https://www.ncaa.org/about/what-we-do/fairness-and-integrity (last visited March 3,
2019).
16
Amateurism is defined as the concept that college athletes should not be paid for their participation in
intercollegiate athletics. See Elisa Kircher Cole, Amateurism – Outdated or Still a Vital Concept, 1 ARIZ. ST. U.
SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 125, 127-29 (2011); See also Rick Volante, Opinion – the Con that is ‘Amateurism’, SPORTS
LITIGATION ALERT (Aug. 31, 2018), http://www.hackneypublications.com/sla/archive/003476.php.
17
The fight against amateurism is currently underway in the Northern District Court of California in In Re: Grantin-aid Cap Anti-trust Litigation. In this case, the Plaintiffs and the class that they hope to represent are former
college football and basketball players who claim to have been exploited by the NCAA through the concept of
amateurism. See, Second Amended Complaint-Class Action Seeking Injunction at 1, In Re: Nat'l Coll. Athletic
Ass'n Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, No. 4:14-md-02541 (N.D. Cal. 2018). A key component of their
argument is that there are valid alternatives to the NCAA competition rules that would adequately regulate college
sports without the need for a uniform price gap by a national body. See, Defendant’s Closing Brief at 46, In Re:
Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, No. 4:14-md-02541 (N.D. Cal. 2018). One of the
alternatives suggested was that the conferences or even the schools take the responsibility of imposing price caps for
the payment of student-athletes in return for services rendered. See, Id. at 47-50. Should the NCAA lose this case
and the price-caps be determined at a conference or school level, there would still be those that would seek to exceed
the price-caps through corruptive schemes in order to gain a competitive advantage. This note hopes to help address
the problem of corruption in the NCAA and NCAA basketball in particular, regardless of whether athletes get paid
more than the cost of attendance, or if the concept of amateurism is left intact.
18
Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating
Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 11-13 (2000) (hereinafter Smith, Brief History).
14
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pride of the schools in regatta sponsored by Elkins Railroad Line.19 Much like the rivalry games
that we are accustomed to today, the events were highly commercialized and each team sought to
find a competitive advantage.20 This competition found itself into other sports beyond football
and Harvard University went so far as obtaining a coxswain who was not a student.21 Thus, as
the commercialization of college sports was born, so too was cheating and corruption in college
sports.
The cheating that existed was not reserved to adding non-student players. The methods of
obtaining an unfair advantage that continue to plague college athletics today were alive and well.
For example, a Yale student-athlete was purported to have received: (1) a suite of rooms at the
dorms; (2) free meals at the University club; (3) a one-hundred dollar scholarship, (4) the profits
from the sale of programs; (5) an Agency arrangement with the American Tobacco Company,
under which he received a commission for the cigarettes sold in New Haven; and (6) a ten-day
paid vacation to Cuba.22 During this time, college athletics were run by students, but in light of
the increase of cheating and injury, the university’s faculty sought to take control and lead the
charge in fighting corruption and promoting safety.23 Even with faculty control, university
presidents still had major concerns.24 President Elliot at Harvard opined that the "lofty gate
receipts from college athletics had turned amateur contests into major commercial spectacles."25
President Walker of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology also lamented that same year
claiming that the academics at colleges were being overshadowed by athletics and stated, "[i]f
the movement shall continue at the same rate, it will soon be fairly a question whether the letters
B.A. stand more for Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Athletics.”26
Understanding that faculty oversight was not enough to address these concerns,
conferences were organized to bring more regulation and governance to these collegiate
contests.27 Unfortunately, the problems were still not solved and the issues in college sports came
to its pinnacle when in 1905, there were eighteen deaths and one-hundred major injuries in
college football alone.28 To address this concern, the President of the United States, Theodore
“Teddy” Roosevelt, met in the Oval Office with representatives of the major college football
institutions to review football rules.29 Notwithstanding President Roosevelt’s input, deaths and
injuries in college football continued.30 New York University’s president called another meeting
with the representatives from major college football institutions that posed the question: was it
possible for college football to be regulated or should football just be abolished at the
intercollegiate level altogether?31 What came out of that meeting was the formation of a Rules
Committee.32 President Roosevelt had the participants of the meeting in the White House to meet
19

Id.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Death Penalty: How Educators Punish
Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L. J. 985, 989 (1987) (hereinafter Smith, Death Penalty).
23
Smith, Brief History at 11.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 12.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
20
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with this Rules Committee and the result was the formation of the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association (IAA). The IAA was an unprecedented organization of sixty-two university leaders
that would take on the burden of regulating and enforcing rules to protect athletes. In 1910, the
IAA was renamed to the National Collegiate Athletic Association.33 Throughout the years, the
role of the NCAA would be expanded from having minimal oversight to the organization of
championships and eventually come to be the regulatory giant that we know today.34 This
structure has changed over time and has adjusted as new concerns arise.
II. Current Structure and Governance of the NCAA
a. Legislative Process and Rule-Making
The NCAA continues to be a member-led organization that is dedicated to college
athletics.35 Today, it is composed of over 1,200 schools, conferences, and other affiliate
organizations divided into three divisions.36 It was necessary to implement a governance
structure to administer intercollegiate athletics while attempting to reconcile the interests of all
stakeholders. The governance models are slightly different for each division.37 This article will
only address the governance of Division I as it is considered to be the most elite and most widely
recognized division; and as such, many of these cases of corruption occur within this division.38
The current structure was adopted in 2014 by the NCAA’s board of directors from a proposal by
the Division I Steering Committee on Governance.39 In this model, the governance takes place
between three main organizations: (1) the board of directors, (2) the council, (3) the council’s
substructure.40
The Board of Directors consists of twenty-four members in the following distribution: ten
presidents from the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), five presidents from the Football
Championships Subdivision (FCS), five presidents from Division I schools without football, one
student-athlete, one athletics director, one faculty athletics representative, and one senior woman
representative.41
The council is composed of thirty-two representatives from conferences.42 These
representatives can be an athletic director, a conference administrator, senior woman
administrator, or faculty athletic administrator.43 It is the intention of the NCAA that at least
sixty percent of the thirty-two seats are athletic directors.44 Additionally, the council has two
33

Id.
Id. at 12-21.
35
NCAA, What is the NCAA?, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited
Nov. 10, 2018).
36
NCAA, Membership, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership (last visited Nov. 10, 2018).
37
Id.
38
See NCSA, The Difference in College Division Levels, https://www.ncsasports.org/recruiting/how-to-getrecruited/college-divisions (last visited March 3, 2019).
39
Michele Brutlag Hosick, Board adopts new Division I Structure, NCAA (Aug. 17, 2014),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/board-adopts-new-division-i-structure.
40
DIVISION I STEERING COMMITTEE ON GOVERNANCE, RECOMMENDED GOVERNANCE MODEL at 5 (2014)
(hereinafter D1 GOVERNANCE MODEL); see also Appendix I.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See Hosick, supra note 31.
34
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student-athletes, four conference commissioners, one 1A faculty athletic representative, and one
faculty athletic representative association representative, all with full voting power.45 It is the
council that makes the day-to-day policy and legislative decisions for Division I.46
To assist the Council, the Council substructure places a high-level focus on subcategories emphasizing the core missions of Division I.47 Currently, there are two such subsets of
the Council.48 The first focuses on academics and the second on championships.49 These subsets
of these Council assist the Council in the creation of legislation and the day-to-day operations in
these two categories.50 The NCAA has a vested interest in both of these areas and rightly has
chosen to keep both championships and academics under the purview of these specialized
groups.
These organizations participate in the creation of legislation using two systems: (1) the
autonomy system, and (2) the Council legislative system.51 The Autonomy system grants
authority to the five major conferences: Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Big 12 Conference,
Big Ten Conference, Pac-12 Conference, and Southeastern Conference (SEC).52 It allows the
sixty-five member institutions that make up these conference in addition to fifteen student-athlete
representatives to adopt legislation specific to the concerns and interests that affect their studentathletes.53 However, the legislation enacted through this process is limited in scope.54 The main
purpose of the legislation from the Autonomy system is to allow the permissive use of resources
to benefit student-athletes and includes other well-being issues.55 In order to ensure that these
purposes are fulfilled and not exceeded to the point of adversely impacting fair competition in
Division I, a Governance Subcommittee of the Board monitors such legislation.56
Under the Council system, all conferences participate in the legislative process.57 The
legislation that comes out of this system is steered towards areas of focus that do not fit within
the Autonomy system.58 Such areas include: “championships administration and policy,
oversight of membership standards, legislation that requires consideration by all conferences,
and management of sports/topic specific studies to formulate recommendations for actions.”59
b. Enforcement
The enforcement of the rules and legislation enacted by the NCAA is done primarily by
three main regulatory organizations within the NCAA national office and is supplemented by the
efforts of the member institutions themselves.60 These three regulatory institutions are known as
45

Id.
Id.
47
See D1 GOVERNANCE MODEL, supra note 32 at 6.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id; see also Appendix II.
52
Id; see also Appendix I.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 7.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See NCAA, ROLES OF THE REGULATORY DEPARTMENTS (2016); see also Appendix III.
46
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the Eligibility Center, the Academic and Membership Affairs (AMA), and the Enforcement
Staff.61 The Eligibility Center certifies the academic and amateur status of athletes that are about
to enter college and seek to compete in NCAA contests but focuses on behavior before the
student enrolls.62 The AMA measures the academic performance of member schools and is
responsible for the interpretation of NCAA legislation and waiving the application of these rules
when appropriate.63 It is the AMA that determines whether a student-athlete may be reinstated,
along with any imposed conditions, when the student-athlete has compromised his or her
eligibility.64 The Enforcement Staff is charged with investigating alleged violations of the rules,
such as corruptive schemes, that are committed by the members of the NCAA.65
During the investigation process, the Enforcement Staff and member-institutions work
together to determine the facts surrounding each allegation.66 Neither the Enforcement Staff nor
the member-institutions have subpoena power to obtain evidence related to the alleged violations
but instead, rely on informal interviews and questioning.67 After the evidence gathering, the
Enforcement Staff makes an initial determination on what level the alleged violations would
constitute.68 The alleged violation is leveled between I-IV based on the severity of the alleged
violation.69 A level IV violation is the least severe and is considered to be a minor violation that
is technical in nature.70 These violations are processed by conference offices without
involvement by the NCAA.71 Level III violations are resolved by the Enforcement Staff
themselves.72 Violations that are more severe and constitute a minimal recruiting competitive
advantage or minimal impermissible benefits are considered Level II violations.73 The most
egregious of infractions are considered Level I infractions, which is what the majority of
infractions regarding corruption would be classified.74 These are infractions are those that
constitute a substantial impermissible benefit or a substantial recruiting, competitive or other
advantage.75 Should the Enforcement Staff decide the allegations amount to a Level I or II
infraction, the alleged violations are reviewed by the Committee on Infractions (COI).76 The COI
is an independent group of qualified representatives from member-schools and the public.77
The COI reviews the facts that were presented to them in order to determine if violations
occurred and what penalties should be assessed.78 After the presentation of evidence by the
Enforcement Staff, the member-institution, and the involved individuals, the COI deliberates

61

Id.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See NCAA, INFRACTIONS PHASES AND PARTIES (2016) (hereinafter NCAA, PHASES).
67
See NCAA, Why Can Infractions Cases Take a Long Time to Investigate?,
http://www.ncaa.org/enforcement/why-can-infractions-cases-take-long-time-investigate (last visited March 3, 2019).
68
See NCAA, VIOLATION STRUCTURE (2016).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
See NCAA, PHASES supra, note 57.
62
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privately.79 A written decision is then released detailing the findings of the COI.80 The decision
is binding upon the parties and is considered to be precedent for future similar violations.81 In the
event that there is no dispute between the Enforcement Staff and the member-institution or
individuals involved, the COI decides the case through an expedited process called summary
disposition.82
When the member-institution or other involved parties do not agree with the findings of
the COI, they may appeal violations or penalties to the Infractions Appeals Committee (IAC). 83
Upon the filing of the appeal, the COI takes over the role held by the Enforcement staff and
defends its findings.84 The IAC takes these arguments by the COI and the arguments presented
by the schools or other parties to make a final determination on whether the findings of the COI
should be affirmed or reversed.85 The decision of the IAC is the end of the road, with its decision
being final and binding upon all parties involved.86
c. Penalties
The penalties available to be imposed on schools by the NCAA through the COI are
enumerated in NCAA Bylaw 19.9.87 Rather than enforce penalties arbitrarily, as some may
believe, the NCAA is bound to enforce the penalties prescribed in its rules.88 The NCAA has
categorized penalties into three classifications: aggravated, standard, and mitigated.89 Looking at
precedent of similar cases and the enumerated aggravating and mitigating factors, the panel of
the COI weighs the evidence presented to determine whether the facts call for a higher or lower
range of penalties.90 Some examples of aggravating factors include: multiple level I violations by
the institution or involved individual; a lack of institutional control; obstruction of the
investigation or an attempt to conceal the violation; violations were premeditated, deliberate, or
committed after substantial planning; or conduct intended to generate pecuniary gain for the
institution or involved individual.91 On the other side, some mitigating factors include: prompt
self-detection and self-disclosure of the violation; affirmative steps to expedite final resolution of
the matter; or exemplary cooperation.92
Once the COI makes the classification for the penalty of aggravated, standard or
mitigated, it may prescribe core penalties that then range in time.93 The core penalties include
seven penalties: (1) Competition Penalties, (2) Financial Penalties, (3) Scholarship Reductions,
(4) Show-Cause Orders, (5) Head Coach Restrictions, (6) Recruiting Restrictions, and (7)

79

Id.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
NCAA, INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES (2016).
88
See NCAA Bylaw 19.9.2.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
See NCAA Bylaw 19.9.3.
92
See NCAA Bylaw 19.9.4.
93
See NCAA Bylaw 19.9.4.
80
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Probation.94 The COI may not depart from these core penalties except in the case of extenuating
circumstances.95 However, even in these circumstances, the NCAA has listed out the additional
penalties that the COI may prescribe.96 Even though the NCAA is restricted in the penalties that
it may prescribe, the extenuating circumstances that allow it to add on to the core penalties are
attenuated at best.
Recently within college basketball, the NCAA reached beyond its core penalties for a
case involving impermissible benefits to a student-athlete from boosters.97 Impermissible
benefits are generally categorized as a level I or II violation.98 The violation would likely be
considered a level II violation if the benefit gained as a result of the violation is minor.99 The
Enforcement Staff and the member-institution, Brigham Young University (BYU) agreed to the
94

See NCAA Bylaw 19.9.5 (the NCAA provides definitions for each of these penalties in NCAA Bylaws 19.9.5.1-.4
as follows: (1) Competition Penalties: Competition limitations on the institution’s participation in postseason play in
the involved sport(s); (2) Financial Penalties: Financial penalties may include requirements that an institution pay a
fine, return revenue received from a specific athletics event or series of events, or face reduction in or elimination of
monetary distribution by the Association; (3) Scholarship Reductions: Limitations on the number of financial aid
awards that that may be provided during a specific period; (4) Show-Cause Orders: If a determination is made by a
hearing panel that an institution has not taken appropriate disciplinary or corrective action regarding an individual
found in violation of the NCAA constitution and bylaws, the panel may issue an order that the institution take
additional disciplinary or corrective action, including but not limited to, restriction of some or all athletically related
duties, unless the institution appears before the panel to show cause why the additional penalties should not be
applied. Decisions regarding disciplinary or corrective actions involving personnel shall be made by the institution,
but the determination of whether the action satisfies the institution’s obligation of NCAA membership shall rest
solely with the COI).
95
See NCAA Bylaw 19.9.6.
96
See NCAA Bylaw 19.9.7 (the additional penalties are as follows: (1) prohibition against specified competition in
the sport during the regular season; (2) Prohibition of all coaching staff members in the sport from involvement,
directly or indirectly, in any coaching activities at the institution during the regular season; (3) Prohibition against
institutional staff members serving on the Board of Directors, Council, or other committees of the Association for a
prescribed period (or requirement that any institution staff members serving in leadership positions on any NCAA
council or committee resign their leadership position); (4) Requirement that the institution relinquish its voting
privilege in the Association for a prescribed period; (5) Recommendation that the institution’s membership in the
Association be suspended or terminated; (6) Public reprimand and censure; (7) Vacation of records in contests in
which a student-athlete competed while ineligible, including one or more of the following: (a.) Vacation of
individual records and performance, (b) Vacation of team records and performances, including wins from the career
record of the head coach in the individual sport, (c) Return of individual or team awards to the Association; (8)
Prohibition against television appearances of the institution in the sport in which the violation occurred. The penalty
shall specify that the institution may not enter into any contracts or agreements for such appearances until the
institution has been restored to full privilege of membership. The Board of Directors is authorized to permit a
closed-circuit telecast, limited to the campus of the opponent of the ineligible institution, provided no rights fee is to
be paid to the ineligible institution; (9) Pursuant to a show-cause order, disassociation of relations with a
representative of an institution’s athletics interests, including: (a) Not accepting any assistance from the individual
that would aid in the recruitment of prospective student or the support of enrolled student-athletes; (b) Not accepting
financial assistance for the institution’s athletics program from the individual; (c) Ensuring that the athletics benefit
or privilege is provided to the individual that is not generally available to the public at large; and (d) Taking such
other actions against the individual that the institution determines to be within its authority to eliminate the
involvement of the individual in the institution’s athletics program; (10) Publicizing institutions on probation on the
NCAA website, in appropriate NCAA publications and in NCAA championship game program of the involved
sports; (11) Institutionally imposed suspension of a staff member from some or all athletically related duties for a
specified period pursuant to a show-cause order, for a situation in which he or she engaged in or condoned a Level I
or Level II violation; or (12) Other penalties as appropriate).
97
See NCAA, Brigham Young University Public Infractions Decision (Nov. 9, 2018).
98
See, NCAA, Most-Frequently Violated Rules (2016).
99
Id.
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facts and violations presented to the COI as set forth in their summary disposition report and the
classification of the violations as level II.100 The COI prescribed core penalties in the form of a
two-year probation, and recruiting restrictions.101 It also agreed with the core penalties selfimposed by BYU for a $5,000.00 fine to the NCAA and one scholarship reduction.102 On top of
these core penalties, the COI also imposed the additional penalties including: public reprimand
and censure, a disassociation from one of the boosters, a vacation of records for the time period
that the student-athlete competed while ineligible, and a list of actions to be taken by BYU to
ensure that compliance and educational programs are up to par.103
BYU only contested the additional penalty that required them to vacate the records for
the competitions that the student-athlete competed in while ineligible.104 One of the arguments
that BYU presented in contesting this penalty was that the COI did not have the authority nor
guidance necessary to prescribe such a penalty.105 The COI determined for itself that it had the
authority to impose a penalty vacating the records according to the Internal Operation Procedures
(IOP).106 The IOP detailed the appropriateness for a vacation of records penalty in the presence
of six factors: (1) academic violations; (2) serious intentional violations; (3) direct involvement
of a coach or a high-ranking school administrator; (4) a large number of violations; (5) a recent
history of level I, level II or major violations; and (6) when a case involves a failure to monitor
or lack of institutional control.107 While this list seems as though it would qualify as the
extenuating circumstances required by NCAA Bylaw 19.9.6, the COI did not indicate the
presence of any of these factors.108 Instead, the COI stated that none of the factors from the IOP
are necessary to impose the penalty but that it may impose an additional penalty for the vacation
of records from the interpretation of prior cases alone.109 In the rest of its explanation, the COI
failed to point to any extenuating circumstance that warranted the inclusion of an additional
penalty outside of the core penalties and refers only to the fact that BYU committed a violation.
While BYU may appeal this penalty to the IAC, the precedent from this case would allow the
COI to impose additional penalties without the presence of additional extenuating circumstances
and could possibly allow the imposition of any additional penalty outside of the core penalties.
The most extreme situation in which the NCAA imposes these additional penalties come
in the form of what is known as the “death penalty.”110 The death penalty refers to the ultimate
culmination of the core penalties and additional penalties outlined in NCAA Bylaw 19, which
effectively cripple an athletic program.111 Specifically, the death penalty consists of: a
prohibition from competition for a time period of one to two years; a prohibition of coaching
activities at the institution; an elimination of scholarships and recruiting activities for a period of
100

Id.at 1.
Id. 14.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 15-16.
104
Id. at 8.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
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up to two years; the requirement that all staff members serving in NCAA organizations must
resign from their positions; and a requirement that the institution give up their voting rights for a
four-year period.112 This extreme option was last implemented on Feb. 25, 1987, to penalize the
Southern Methodist University (SMU) football program for brazen instances of paying studentathletes under the table in one of the biggest scandals in college football.113 The use of this
penalty resulted in SMU losing its place as a premier football athletics program.114 Since the
penalty, SMU has yet to join one of the top conferences and has only had three winning
seasons.115
The death penalty, and particularly its implementation on SMU, illustrates that the
NCAA can effectively punish the institutions that compose its membership. The NCAA has a
broad power to impose the penalties it has enumerated in its bylaws and has shown that it may
impose additional penalties based primarily on its own discretion. The problem that remains is
that the majority of these penalties, such as the death penalty, affect the institution as a whole,
but do not directly punish coaches or third-party actors themselves. As a result, coaches and
third-party actors are not disincentivized from engaging in corruption schemes and in turn
college athletics suffers.
Regulation of Agents
One particular group of third-party actors that has facilitated much of the corruption in
college sports is agents.116 Sports agents are generally associated with professional sports
because of the prohibition of the use of agents by college athletes by the NCAA.117 However,
many student-athletes have been found to be working with agents and receiving benefits.118 After
a string of agent violations by student-athletes and various cases of agents taking advantage of
athletes, legislatures implemented measures that would deter agents from wrongfully working
with student-athletes.119
On the state level, legislatures implemented the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) to
protect universities and student-athletes.120 The UAAA was created in 2000 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.121 The purpose of the UAAA is to protect
universities by protecting their financial investment in student-athlete scholarships and to protect
student-athletes themselves through education about the sports-agent selection process.122 To
accomplish these goals, the UAAA required sports agents to register with the secretary of state in
their respective jurisdiction in order to engage in correspondence with collegiate student-

112

See NCAA, Enforcement Process: Penalties, supra note 104.
See Dennis Dodd, supra note 111.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
See e.g., Thomas J. Arkell, Agent Interference with College Athletics: What Agents Can and Cannot Do and
What Institutions Should Do in Response, 4 SPORTS LAW. J. 147 (1997).
113

117

See e.g. NCAA Bylaw 12.3.1.
See e.g. Ross Viltz et al., An Analysis of Sports Agent Regulation in Intercollegiate Athletics: a Call of for
Cooperation, 24 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 62, 64-67 (2014).
119
Id. at 68.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
118

76

DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 15, Issue 1

athletes.123 A registered agent then has the duty to disclose to the university if a student-athlete
signs a contract with them before the student athlete's eligibility expires.124 If an agent fails to
perform any of these requirements from the UAAA, then the agent can be subjected to civil,
criminal, and administrative penalties.125
While the UAAA addressed the concerns around agent misconduct, it wasn’t without
126
fault. To begin with, the UAAA has a narrow definition of agent that did not include
individuals who do not necessarily recruit or solicit agency contracts.127 Additionally, even
though the UAAA was enacted in 43 states, many states made amendments to the law and all of
the states experienced difficulties in enforcement.128 Because of these faults, there have been
many agents who did not act within the bounds of the UAAA.129 Thus, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act
(RUAAA) in 2015.130
The goal of the RUAAA was to provide enhanced protection for student-athletes and
educational institutions.131 To reach this goal, the RUAAA expanded the definition of agent to
other individuals who serve athletes for compensation in an advisory capacity relating to
finances, business pursuits, or career management decisions.132 The RUAAA also attempts to
provide added standardization in the creation of a uniform body of agent registration information
for use by state agencies.133 An interesting alteration made to the RUAAA was the addition of
criminal penalties for agents who encourage other individuals to engage in activity prohibited to
the agent.134 Since its creation, the RUAAA has been implemented in twelve states and proposed
in three others while other states continue to utilize the UAAA.135
On the federal level is the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA).136
SPARTA was signed into law as a federal measure to assist the UAAA.137 This law does not
preempt the UAAA or any of its measures but instead fills in the gaps not addressed by the statelaw directives.138 Introduced by Representative Tom Osbourne in 2003, SPARTA seeks to
protect student-athletes and universities from unscrupulous behavior that Representative
Osbourne witnessed during his tenure as the head football coach at the University of
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Nebraska.139 To do this, SPARTA prohibited conduct almost identical to the conduct prohibited
under the UAAA and shares its definition for an ”athlete-agent.”140 The biggest difference
between these two attempts to regulate sports agents is the enforcement method.141 Under
SPARTA, violations are treated as unfair trade practice and can be prosecuted by the FTC at the
federal level or by a state’s attorney general.142 The agent is the only party who can be held liable
under SPARTA, unlike the RUAAA which extended penalties beyond agents to those who serve
in an advisory capacity to the athletes.143
The UAAA, RUAAA, and SPARTA have all made efforts to stop the corruption in sports
that is facilitated through agents. Unfortunately, these laws have been difficult to prosecute.144
The Associated Press reported in 2010, that less than half of the states that enacted some form of
sports agent laws had invoked any type of penalty.145 The FTC, in comparison, has yet to
undertake any enforcement action under SPARTA and has received very few complaints.146 This
lack of enforcement is regrettably not caused by a lack of activity that violates these laws but
rather due to the difficulties associated with the enforcement.147
Regulation of Coaches and Third Parties
Outside of agents, there is very little regulation over other third parties that are involved
in collegiate athletics. The NCAA asserted its right to punish coaches in NCAA v. Tarkanian
through a show-cause order.148 A show-cause order is an order that compels a member-institution
to demonstrate to the COI why it should not be subject to a penalty or additional penalty for the
failure to take appropriate disciplinary or corrective action.149 In practice, these orders are
referred to as a” Scarlet Letter” that requires schools to convince the COI that it should not be
penalized for hiring a coach that has previously been charged with a high-level infraction.150 The
show-cause order can vary in time from three years all the way up to ten years.151
Todd McNair, a former assistant football coach for the University of Southern California
(USC), challenged the show-cause order in a suit against the NCAA in the Los Angeles Superior
Court.152 Coach McNair was a part of the USC scandal from 2010 in which student-athletes,
most notably Reggie Bush, received impermissible benefits in connection with an aspiring sports
agency.153 The NCAA imposed a one-year show-cause order against McNair based on the
139
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reasoning that he knew, or should have known, about the benefits that Reggie Bush was
receiving.154 McNair claims that this short show-cause order unfairly prejudiced him and
essentially blackballed him from being hired as a coach at another university. 155 In the showcause lawsuit, the judge held that the show-cause order violated California’s Business and
Professions Code, that maintains that any contract which restrains one from engaging in a lawful
profession is void.156
The holding, in this case, places the show-cause order on equal-footing with other noncompete agreements that are regulated by states in many different ways. This ruling presents a
danger to the NCAA in that it will lose a critical tool in the efforts to disincentivize coaches and
other institutional staff members from breaking the NCAA rules. The president of the Pac-12
conference, Larry Scott, expressed this fear in his testimony to the court. He stated that by
disarming the NCAA of the show-cause penalty, the ruling would reach beyond Coach McNair
and deeply impact the Pac-12 and NCAA member institutions.157 Scott opined that it would be
difficult for the California schools that are members of the Pac-12 to continue their membership
in the NCAA if the show-cause penalty was void in California.158 In turn, this would cut off
these schools from competitive and scholarship opportunities that stem from their participation in
the NCAA.159 The effects would then trickle down to the Pac-12 since one-third of its members
are California institutions.160 While the ruling of this case is confined to California for now, it
may have far-reaching effects and effectively disarm the NCAA from being able to punish
institutional actors with show-cause penalties, thus leaving no real penalties for actors aside from
the institution itself.
III. The FBI Investigation into College Basketball
In 2015, the FBI and the United States Attorney’s Office began to investigate the
criminal influence of money on coaches and athletes who participated in NCAA competition.161
The investigation revealed multiple instances of bribes paid by financial advisors, business
managers, and high-level apparel company employees which were facilitated by NCAA Division
I coaches.162 These payments were made to the athletes themselves and to the families of those
athletes in exchange for the commitment to attend a specific university and a promise to be
represented by the advisors once the athletes entered the National Basketball Association
(NBA).163 Such payments are prohibited by the NCAA and make the student-athlete ineligible
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to participate in NCAA competitions.164 In order to shield the student-athletes that were being
paid from punishment by the NCAA or their school, participants in the scheme took steps to
conceal the payments by: (1) funneling them to student-athletes and/or their families through a
third party or a non-profit institution run by the participants in the scheme; and (2) making or
intending to make misrepresentations regarding the involvement of the student-athletes and
coaches that violated the NCAA rules.165 Utilizing wiretaps, surveillance videos, undercover
agents, a raid on the offices of ASM (a prominent sports agency) and cooperating witnesses, the
FBI gathered evidence against various people involved in these payment schemes.166
The FBI received help during the investigation into coaches and advisors paying NCAA
student-athletes by a cooperating witness, Louis Martin Blazer III, the founder of Blazer Capital
Management.167 Blazer was accused of stealing $2.35 million dollars by the Securities Exchange
Commission for investing client funds without their knowledge in 2011 and 2012.168 He entered
into a plea agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office and pled guilty to securities fraud,
aggravated identity theft, false statements and documents, and two counts to commit wire
fraud.169 As a part of the wire fraud charges, Blazer was a part of a scheme to pay NCAA
athletes to induce them to retain Blazer as a financial advisor.170 With Blazer’s cooperation, a
domino effect occurred that led to the implication of many in this scheme to pay NCAA
athletes.171
On September 26, 2017, the investigation came to fruition when the FBI and the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York announced the arrests of ten men.172
Among these ten were assistant basketball coaches for NCAA Division I teams.173 Included in
this group were coaches Chuck Person of Auburn, Lamont Evans of Oklahoma State, Emanuel
“Book” Richardson of the University of Arizona, and Tony Bland of USC.174 Each of these
parties faces charges for bribery conspiracy, solicitation of bribes, honest services fraud
conspiracy, honest services fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and Travel Act
conspiracy.175 In a press conference addressing these charges the acting United States Attorney
for the Southern District of New York described the acts committed by these coaches and
advisors as an exploitation of “the hoop dreams of student-athletes around the country, allegedly
164
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treating them as little more than opportunity to enrich themselves through the alleged bribery and
fraud schemes.”176
a. The Gatto Trial
The first of three trials, United States v. Gatto, which ended October 25, 2018, involved
James Gatto, Merl Code, and Christian Dawkins who faced charges of wire fraud and the
conspiracy to commit wire fraud.177 In this trial, it was demonstrated that the United States had
an interest in the presence of corruption in college sports. The charges against Gatto and his codefendants centered around the payment of high-level recruits to attend the University of
Louisville and the University of Miami.178
The wire-fraud charge that associated with the University of Louisville, came from the
attempt to pay recruit Brian “Tugs” Bowen to play for a Coach Pitino led Louisville Cardinal
basketball team.179 Tugs Bowen initially was interested in attending the University of Arizona
and also had ties to the University of Oregon.180 This all changed in May of 2017 when Gatto
and Dawkins pressed Tugs to go to the University of Louisville, an "Adidas school," by offering
cash.181 Twenty-thousand dollars was funneled to Tugs Bowen’s father as part of a promised
hundred-thousand dollar payout.182 When Bowen decided to attend the University of Louisville,
Gatto left coach Rick Pitino a voicemail to congratulate him on Bowens committing to the
University of Louisville.183 The University itself was unaware of this plan to pay Bowens to
attend the University of Louisville.184
The wire-fraud charge that was associated with the University of Miami, came with
similar circumstances to the University of Louisville.185 The defense argued by the defendants
essentially detailed that while it was true that they were involved in this payment scheme, all that
occurred was a violation of NCAA rules, not the law.186 In fact, the defendants claimed that their
actions were at the behest of the Universities and for their benefit.187 They purported that it was
the coaching staff at both universities that sought for the defendants to pay these athletes and
therefore there could be no fraud.188 The prosecution argued that it was not the Universities that
were benefitting or seeking to benefit from these payment schemes but that instead, it was the
coaches at those programs that were working in concert with the defendants in order to conceal
the bribe payments from the officials at the University of Louisville and the University of
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Miami.189 The jury agreed with the prosecution and convicted all defendants with conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and wire fraud.190 Both the federal government and the jury agreed that these
payment schemes harm the universities and constitute fraud, illustrating that there is a clear
interest in the regulation and protection of college athletics outside of the private non-profit
institution that is the NCAA.
b. The NCAA’s Response
After the initial discoveries regarding the FBI investigation came to light, the NCAA let the
FBI continue in its inquiry without interference.191 As a result, the NCAA has yet to conduct its
own investigation into the allegation brought forth and at the time of this article has yet to
attempt any punishment of the actors involved.192 Nevertheless, the president of the NCAA,
Mark Emmert,193 articulated the concern held by the NCAA and stated that, “The nature of the
charges brought by the federal government are deeply disturbing. We have no tolerance
whatsoever for this alleged behavior. Coaches hold a unique position of trust with studentathletes and their families and these bribery allegations, if true, suggest an extraordinary and
despicable breach of that trust.”194
To address this problem, the NCAA, at the behest of Mark Emmert, organized a commission
on college basketball.195 The commission was charged to examine the critical aspects of
Division-I men’s basketball and report back to the NCAA Board of Directors and President their
findings and proposed solutions.196 In doing so, the commission was encouraged to identify
legislative, policy and structural modifications to improve the integrity of the NCAA processes
and the well-being of student-athletes.197 To accomplish these goals, Mark Emmert appointed
Dr. Condoleezza Rice, former U.S. Secretary of State to chair the commission.198 Other members
of the commission included former Duke basketball star, Grant Hill; Former White House
Counsel, Kathryn Reummler; and Mike Montgomery, a former college basketball coach.
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Around six months after its inception, the commission on basketball released its report on the
current state of men’s college basketball.199 In its findings, it found the state of men’s college
basketball is deeply troubled.200 The commission described the levels of corruption and
deception to be, “at a point that they threaten the very survival of the college game as we
know.”201 To fix these problems the commission sought change in four strategic areas.202 First,
the commission recommended a focus on creating realistic pathways for student-athlete
success.203 Part of this focus involves the ending of the one-and-done rule which prohibits
athletes from entering the NBA until one year after the end of their high school career.204 While
the commission recognized that the power to end the practice was left to the NBA and the
National Basketball Players Association, the commission maintained that young athletes should
not be forced to attend college if that is not something that they are interested in.205 Ending oneand-done would allow these players to turn professional and would take some of the pressure off
of the collegiate model.206 Additionally, the commission recommended that student-athletes be
able to maintain their eligibility if they declare for the NBA draft and are not drafted.207 This
would add further protection to college student-athletes who misjudge their professional
prospects and who are, at times, misled.208
Next, the commission recommended a focus on holding institutions and individuals
accountable.209 To do this, the commission advocated for the establishment of professional and
neutral investigation and adjudication of serious infractions, and an increase in the core penalty
structure.210 It was critical of the fact that those who currently resolve and address serious cases
violations of NCAA rules are volunteers from member institutions.211 By bringing in
professionals, the NCAA would be able to restore credibility to the adjudication of high stakes
infractions.212 The commission also recognized that there are very few risks to an institution
should it choose to employ a coach with a show cause order and that the punishment in itself was
generally weak.213 An increase in penalties within the core penalty structure and individual
accountability would make up for this weakness and would incentivize stakeholders to diligently
comply with NCAA rules.214
Furthermore, the commission’s third strategic area of focus related to mitigating nonscholastic basketball’s sometimes harmful influence on college basketball.215 The commission
described youth basketball in this country as being ungoverned space and while there are good
199
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programs, there are many that condone illicit behavior.216 To try and limit the risk, the
commission recommended that the NCAA adopt and enforce criteria for certifying nonscholastic basketball events with a strict environment of financial transparency.217 The
commission also called for the same financial transparency from apparel companies speaking to
the fact that they are public companies and should be concerned with how their money is being
used.218 With transparency, the risk of associating with those that blatantly disregard NCAA
rules and put student-athletes’ eligibility at risk would be mitigated.219
Lastly, the commission sought a final focus on the NCAA governance structure.220 It claims
that the current structure and system isn’t working.221 The commission recommends that the five
independent public members with voting rights be inserted into the Board of Governors and for
one of those five to also serve on the NCAA’s executive board.222 These independent members
of the public would bring an outside, objective perspective and would assist the NCAA on
correcting its current course.223 In conclusion, the commission called for action from the
members of the NCAA and for prompt action to take place.224
After the commission issued its findings and recommendations, the NCAA Board of
Governors and the Division I Board of Directors promptly adopted a series of reforms that
implemented many of the recommendations from the commission on basketball.225 These
changes to NCAA rules allow prospective student-athletes to have more paid visits to colleges,
allows top prospects to obtain the advice of NCAA certified agents during the offseason, and
places more restrictions on non-scholastic summer youth basketball tournaments.226
Additionally, the investigations and enforcement process was updated and now allows the
NCAA to rely on the conclusions of other bodies such as courts or administrative bodies.227
These changes sought to implement the goals of the commission on basketball without instituting
some of the more radical changes suggested by others such as payment of the athletes.228
IV. Proposed Solution
The recommendation from the commission on basketball and the changes implanted by the
NCAA are a good start but are fall short of the mark. The commission is correct that the state of
college basketball is troubled. Large scale corruption and deception call for large scale reforms
to weed out the illicit behavior by many of the actors associated with college basketball. This is
no longer a problem that can be left to the NCAA or its member institution alone. The state of
affairs in college basketball calls for action from state and federal legislatures, USA basketball,
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and the NBA. This section suggests methods in which many of the parties that have an impact on
college basketball can asset in correcting its current course.
a. New Statutory Scheme
State Legislatures
The commission on basketball recommended greater punishments but its recommendations
only focused on institutional actors. The NCAA does not have the power to punish noninstitutional actors on its own and with the weakness of the show-cause order, has very little
power to punish coaches. Thus, the NCAA would need help from outside sources to punish those
who engage in corruption. This help could easily come from the states.
Many of the Division I member institutions are public schools and receive funding from the
state governments.229 Every time that a student-athlete becomes ineligible due to corruption
schemes, the state's investment that leads to scholarships is put at risk. To protect their
investment and more importantly to protect student-athletes from being exploited, state
legislatures should implement a new statutory scheme that would disincentivize those that would
exploit student-athletes through harsher punishments. Fortunately, the framework needed
already exists in many states in the form of the RUAAA. Nonetheless, significant changes would
have to be made to the RUAAA in order for it to effectively disincentivize non-institutional
actors and coaches.
The first change that would need to be made would be an adjustment of the scope of the
RUAAA. As it currently stands, the RUAAA regulates the actions of agents and those that
perform work on behalf of agents in addition to those that would serve in advisory capacity to
the student-athlete.230 The change was a large improvement from the narrow scope of the
UAAA that only applied to agents but should be broadened further. An appropriate scope would
allow the RUAAA to apply to anyone that intentionally facilitates or contributes to the payment
of student-athletes that would lead to the student-athletes ineligibility through extending the
definition of “agent-athlete. “231 This broadened scope could then apply the punishments from
the RUAAA, including both civil and criminal penalties, to non-institutional actors and coaches.
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See Michael L. Martin, It’s Not a Foul Unless the Ref Blows the Whistle: How to Step Up Enforcement of the
UAAA and SPARTA, supra note 136.
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To effectuate this proposal, this note proposes amending section 2(2)(a) of the RUAAA to read:
“Means an individual, whether or not registered under this act, who: directly or indirectly facilitates,
recruits, or solicits a student athlete to enter into an contract or, for compensation, procures employment or
offers, promises, attempts, or negotiates to obtain employment for a student athlete as a professional athlete
or member of a professional sports team or organization; for compensation or in anticipation of
compensation related to a student athlete’s participation in athletics: serves the athlete in an advisory
capacity on a matter related to finances, business pursuits, or career management decisions; or in
anticipation of benefiting from a purpose related to the athlete’s participation in athletics: (i) gives
consideration to the student athlete or another person; (ii) serves the athlete in an advisory capacity on a
matter related to finances, business pursuits, or career management decisions; (iii) manages the business
affairs of the athlete by providing assistance with bills, payments, contracts, or taxes; or (iv) as a result of
the relationship causes the student athlete to become ineligible.”
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Another change that should be made to the RUAAA is an increase in civil penalties.
Currently, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recommends that
the minimum amount for civil penalties should be fifty-thousand dollars.232 In comparison, the
top head coaches in college basketball make three-million dollars up to almost nine-million
dollars.233 The increasingly lucrative incentives that coaches and other actors have to engage in
corruption should be outweighed by the potential penalty. Thus, the recommended mandatory
minimum civil penalty should be increased to adequately disincentivize the head coaches and
non-institution actors.
Lastly, the RUAAA should grant the NCAA standing to bring a civil action for damages for
violation of the act. The NCAA is made up of the member institutions that are harmed each time
that corruption prevails. Through the nature of its relationship and dependency on the
institutions, the NCAA suffers the same harm. At this time, the RUAAA recognized the harms
that colleges and universities suffer as a result of bad actors and gives the institutions the
standing to bring a civil suit. This same opportunity should be extended to the NCAA. Many
institutions choose not to pursue suit due to the resources involved and allowing the NCAA to
bring suit on its own would shift some of the burdens from the schools.
The culmination of these changes to the RUAAA would result in added pressure on those
that would seek to engage in corruption schemes. Head coaches and noninstitutionalized actors
would be held accountable for their actions beyond the limited authority of the NCAA. These
changes, in the end, serve the states themselves as they protect the public universities in their
jurisdictions.
Federal Legislature
The federal government also has an interest in protecting college basketball as billions of
dollars flow from the federal government through the member institutions of the NCAA.234 This
interest is broadened by the new focus on integrity in sports from the United Nations. On the
UN's 2030 agenda lies a sting initiative to work towards the creation of policy and a framework
that supports the protection of sports from those that would seek to corrupt sports institutions.
Leading up to the agenda, UNESCO has put the focus on the integrity in sports and the role that
sports play in the stability of countries around the world. In response to the findings of UNESCO
and the approaching the 2030 UN agenda, the federal government has the opportunity to take a
proactive approach and institute measures to fix the problems of corruption within the United
States. The federal government has acknowledged its interest and ability to impact the corruption
in college basketball through the FBI investigations.
It is incumbent for the federal government to continue in its efforts to fight corruption in
college sports and one way in which they might do that is through legislation. Similarly to the
state legislatures, the federal government could enact better safeguards through the improvement
of the current legislation governing agents, SPARTA.

See Unif. Law Comm’n, Athletes Agent Act, Revised, supra note 135.
See Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/mensbasketball/coach/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
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See e.g., Kelli Woodhouse, Impact of Pell Surge, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 12, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/12/study-us-higher-education-receives-more-federal-stategovernments.
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The same edits as the ones proposed in this article for the RUAAA would greatly increase the
efficacy of SPARTA in fighting corruption. However, a large problem would still remain in its
enforcement. As previously mentioned, the FTC is responsible for the enforcement of SPARTA
and violations are considered unfair trade practices. This method of enforcement has been largely
ineffective, and a different methodology is necessary. It has been proposed that an independent,
federal commission be created under the Department of Education so that enforcement measures
could actually take place.235 While this would likely improve enforcement measures, this article
proposes a different solution.
Instead of leaving the enforcement measure to the FTC or an independent commission, the
NCAA and individual institutions should be able to bring a statutory claim for civil damages. By
allotting the NCAA and individual institutions standing, the burden placed on the FTC for
investigation and enforcement would be eliminated. The NCAA would already have conducted
their own investigation in which they could gather information to bring suit, and then could take
advantage of the subpoena power and the discovery mechanisms when filing a statutory claim.
These mechanisms would bolster the NCAA’s ability to uncover a larger extent of corruption
and would allow them redress for the wrongs committed to them as laid out in SPARTA.
Although the allotment of the NCAA or individual institutions to file a statutory claim under
SPARTA would render the FTC’s role in enforcement unnecessary, this article contemplates an
enforcement method that would continue to involve the FTC and allow them to pursue a claim
for unfair trade practice while allowing the NCAA to pursue claim itself. This process would
run similar to filing a claim for workplace discrimination with the EEOC.236 The NCAA would
first file a claim with the FTC or an independent commission asserting its claim against the actor
who purportedly violated SPARTA. The FTC could then choose whether or not to pursue its own
claim against the bad actors for unfair trade practices. If they did not, then the NCAA could take
their suit for civil damages themselves.
The dual threat of suit from the NCAA and the FTC would greatly deter those that would
engage in corruption schemes and would solve the issues surrounding SPARTA regarding
enforcement. Such a system is currently in place with labor disputes and could be easily
implemented. By increasing the enforcement methods in SPARTA, the legislation would be
effective in deterring those that would take advantage of student-athletes and defraud the
universities. Thus, the interests of the federal government coming from its financial interests and
UNESCO's Kazan Plan would be furthered as it protects the integrity of collegiate sports.
b. De-regulation by NCAA
The NCAA started on the right track with the new regulations implemented at the
recommendation from the commission on basketball. However, more work is needed. The new
regulations allow for greater access to agents for elite athletes but there is much to be desired
when it comes to the education and counseling that student-athletes receive when they are
considering going pro. The NCAA needs to address this need through deregulation. Instead of a
rule favoring elite athletes, all athletes should be able to speak to an agent in the off-season.
While the NCAA contemplates the necessary assistance in helping high school seniors, the
235
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87

DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 15, Issue 1

option to transition to professional basketball can happen at any time during one’s career. The
access to agents, so long as it is monitored and regulated, would be beneficial to any of the
student-athletes.
Deregulation in this area would undoubtedly be a risk as many impermissible benefits and
relationships happen with agents. However, with the new rules regarding registration
requirements for agents, the risks could be mitigated. Individual institutions would need to
monitor agent interactions. Such interactions could be monitored by having them on campus or
with institutional supervision. Regardless of the monitoring effort used, the benefits to the
student-athlete would enable them to make a more educated decision when choosing whether or
not to transition to professional sports. This would help lessen corruption efforts as students
would be able to decide whether the college trek suits them and avoid it if it does not.
c. Help from USA basketball and the NBA
Both USA Basketball and the NBA have an interest in college sports. The NBA is made up
of many athletes who first competed on the collegiate level.237 USA basketball is the national
governing body for basketball in the United States.238 The NCAA, USA Basketball, and the
NBA have all agreed to work together to fix the issues facing college basketball but have yet to
define what steps will be taken to address these issues.239 This section will propose actions that
each organization can take to have a substantial effect on college sports.
USA Basketball
The NCAA included USA Basketball in its legislation passed to address the
recommendations from the commission on basketball.240 USA Basketball is charged, through the
legislation, with the responsibility of rating high school student-athletes.241 Those students who
are classified as “elite” would be able to communicate and develop a contractual relationship
with agents that are registered with the NCAA during the summer of their senior year of high
school.242 The purpose of this legislation is to let these high school students decide whether they
should pursue a professional career or play in college sports. In addition to this responsibility,
USA Basketball should form a partnership with the NCAA in being the exclusive organizer for
non-scholastic basketball tournaments.
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See USA Basketball, About USA Basketball, https://www.usab.com/about/about-usabasketball.aspx?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIlNSI08Ln4AIVAh-tBh1VlQxBEAAYASABEgKBGPD_BwE (last visited
March 3, 2019).
239
See Brian Windhorst, NBA, NCAA, players association align as a step toward one-and-done rule elimination,
ESPN (Oct. 18, 2018), http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/24513084/in-step-abolition-one-done-rule-basketballstakeholders-align-support-usa-basketball.
See, Adrian Wojnarowski, Sources: NCAA’s new proposed rules blindside execs from NBA, USA Basketball,
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The commission on basketball cited non-scholastic basketball tournaments as being an
area of concern.243 It is at these tournaments, where college coaches, agents, apparel company
employees, and other converge on student-athletes.244 In order to try and mitigate this problem,
USA Basketball should be made the exclusive organizer for NCAA sanctioned basketball
tournaments. Coaches would only be permitted to attend these non-scholastic tournaments and
the actors that are involved with the tournament could be adequately vetted. The burden for
ensuring transparency for these tournaments would fall on USA Basketball. This burden, while
great, would still offer a benefit for USA Basketball. As the sole organizer for these tournaments,
USA Basketball would be able to capitalize from sponsors and other entities that would want to
be involved in the tournament. While USA Basketball is a non-profit organization,245 it would
still be able to further the goals of its organization through this extra flow of capital. In turn, the
dangers of the non-scholastic tournaments could be diminished.
NBA
The NBA is in a unique position as it is directly affected by the dealings that occur
throughout college basketball. Many of the players in the NBA once demonstrating their athletic
ability in the college setting. The NCAA has already called for the NBA to eliminate “one-anddone,” but the NBA could provide other assistance to the NCAA by developing its “GLeague.”246
The G-League, currently, does not have a good reputation for being a stepping stone to
enter the NBA.247 In fact, the connotation of playing in the G-League is generally negative.248
For high-school athletes who are not interested in going to college but do have a desire to play
professionally, the G-League should be the ideal destination for these student-athletes. In order
to make the G-League a more desirable option for the athletes, the NBA should focus on creating
more incentives for athletes to start their professional careers in the G-league if they are unable
to do so directly in the NBA.
The first way that the NBA should seek to do this is through its broadcasting rights. The
G-League has very limited exposure and compared to the college scene, the G-league games are
not discussed or even easily watched on television. To fix this, the NBA should aggressively
pursue over-the-top media services.249 With the growing interest in streaming services and the
global phenomenon that came from Netflix, more and more people are switching from traditional
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cable to streaming services.250 This is an opportunity that the G-League should take advantage of
and push as a way to watch the G-League. While the NBA is already doing this to an extent with
steaming on twitch and the NBA app,251 more opportunities now exist in the realm of sports with
Hulu Live TV and ESPN+ services. A partnership with one of these entities would drastically
increase the coverage of the G-League and further incentivize student-athletes to consider the GLeague as a valid alternative to playing college basketball and could help build the market that
the G-League has yet to capture.
Should the NBA continue to make efforts in creating OTT broadcasting relationships, the
number of sponsorships and corporate partners that the G-League will receive would likely
increase. In turn, this added revenue could be distributed to the players, increasing their salary.
With more money and more exposure, the G-League would start to get rid of its negative
connotations. Only when the G-League becomes a more incentivizing option for student-athletes
will, high school athletes see it as a viable option. Thus, those that would engage in corruption
schemes for money, while they stay in college begrudgingly, would have another way to earn
money and avoid a college stint that they would rather avoid.
IV. Conclusion
The current state of college basketball is unnerving. Without a change in the immediate
future, the world could lose the current system of college sports that exists in the United States.
This system is unique and allows students who could not otherwise afford to attend a four-year
university the opportunity to pursue their educational dreams. The world has identified the need
for integrity in sports and the United States government has demonstrated its interest through the
FBI investigation of college basketball in 2017. Corruption in college sports must be fought and
the NCAA does currently not have enough power to win that fight. Non-institutional actors and
coaches are hard to punish with the lack of authority and punishments available to the NCAA.
To fill this gap an assist is needed from state governments, the national government, USA
Basketball, and the NBA. Through legislation that facilitates enforcement and punishment of bad
actors, state governments and the national government can be deterrents while USA Basketball
and the NBA create programs that incentivize the correct behaviors. Sports help contribute to the
stability of countries and the development of societal values. It is time to give the deference
needed to these issues and take steps to ensure that integrity in college sports survives.
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Appendix I
Committee of
Infractions

Board of Directors
Serve as the overall governing body for
the Division, with responsibilities for
strategy, policy, legislative and
management.

Infractions Appeals
Committee

Sub- Council
Academic

Council Primary

PAG
Presidents in Conferences Not
Represented On The Board
Source Of Strategic Input and
Advice

Responsibility for Legislative and
Championships Issues
Collaborative board on Strategic
Issues and Policy Issues
Could also Include StudentAthlete Well- Being Issues.

Sub- Council
Championships
Playing and Practice
Seasons and NCAA
Championships

SubCouncil
Legislative
Formulation

APR, Academic Penalties,
GSR, Initial, Continuing and
Transfer Eligibility
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Appendix II
COUNCIL MEETING
Voting on all proposals. Simple majority required for adoption based on weighted voting.
Results final after next Division I Board of Directions meeting.

Proposal adopted with
85% majority or greater:
Final -Adopted

A defeated proposal may
not be resubmitted for a
two year period

A proposal adopted with less
than 85% majority: subject to 60
day period in which schools can
request to rescind.

Proposal receives minimum
request to rescind (66.7% of
eligible members).
Final - Defeated

Proposal receives fewer
than the required number
of request to rescind.
Final - Adopted
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Appendix III
Enforcement Stuff
Reviews Information
About Potential
Violations

Facts do not support
further investigation

Enforcement Stuff
Conducts
Investigation

Potential
Level I /II violation

SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
COI issues decision

Penalties may
be appealed to
IAC

Stuff Decides
Investigation is
Unnecessary

HEARING
COI issues decision

COI decision
may be
appealed to
IAC

Level III Violation

Student-athlete
eligibility violation

Enforcement staff
processes case and
issues decision

Reinstatement staff
processes case and
issues decision

Staff decision
may be
appealed to
COI

Staff decision
may be
appealed to
SAR

